The following is the transcript of episode 60 of the weekly El Faro English podcast, Central America in Minutes.
RUBIO: In the case of Russia, their primary presence of influence in the region is Venezuela and to some extent Nicaragua and Cuba, which is where they operate.
GRESSIER, HOST: In Washington last week, the U.S. Senate summoned Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss policy in Venezuela after the snatching of Nicolás Maduro.
The Nicaraguan press widely picked up this statement, running titles like “The U.S. says Nicaragua Serves as a Base for Russian Operations in the Western Hemisphere.”
But in reality, the reference was oblique at best — not unlike the broader U.S. ambiguity toward Nicaragua.
Sanctions skip CAFTA in Nicaragua
Nicaragua has fewer and fewer international friends these days. But those who are in their corner know how to pack a punch.
Nicaraguan security forces train with Russian counterparts, and press reports indicate that Russians are implicated in espionage against Nicaraguan dissidents. In recent weeks, Nicaragua announced new commercial agreements with both China and Russia, including for steel extracted from occupied Ukraine.
Last year, Rubio called the Ortega-Murillo regime an “enemy of humanity” fueling migration to the United States. And he continued the Biden-era policy of visa sanctions — now affecting upwards of 2,000 Nicaraguan officials.
But he’s more focused on Cuba, his parents’ country of birth, while Trump is fixated on Greenland and Panama.
That said, the U.S. invasion of Venezuela did set off alarm bells in Nicaragua. Co-dictator Rosario Murillo stepped up domestic surveillance, while avoiding head-on confrontation.
After Venezuela began to release political prisoners, Murillo and Ortega announced that “dozens of people” had been freed from their own prisons, supposedly to commemorate 19 years in power. U.S. officials had publicly called on them to do this.
Trade has been another point of ambiguity. Last year, the Trump administration debated whether to suspend Nicaragua from CAFTA, claiming that repression in the country has affected commerce.
Podcast: No Right to a Funeral in Nicaragua
This is not a new debate. Both major U.S. political parties have proposed CAFTA sanctions for years, and all that saber-rattling was one of the reasons Nicaragua refused to allow a new U.S. ambassador to arrive in 2022.
Trump decided the U.S. will increase tariffs to 28 percent next January. With one major catch: They won’t touch CAFTA products.
Even more gray is drug interdiction. Last year, INL, a wing of the State Department leading this issue, wrote that the DEA would terminate operations in Nicaragua in 2025, “partly due to the lack of cooperation from Nicaragua’s agencies.”
But Trump has yet to make good on that announcement. Last month, an unnamed White House official told Politico that “Nicaragua is cooperating with us to stop drug trafficking and fight criminal elements in their territory.”
Juan Gonzalez, a former top Biden official, told Politico: “The lesson from Nicaragua is: Don’t matter too much, don’t embarrass Washington and don’t become a domestic political issue.”
He added, “For an administration that doesn’t care about democracy or human rights, that’s an effective survival strategy for authoritarians.”
A new president in Costa Rica
Next to Costa Rica. On Sunday, conservative Laura Fernández won the presidency by a sweeping margin. Fernández has proclaimed herself outgoing president Rodrigo Chaves’ “heir” and promised continuity. She’s even offered Chaves the same top post in her cabinet that she held in his.
Chaves, who has around 60 percent support in the country, is the main ally of Salvadoran dictator Nayib Bukele in Central America. He has spent his administration touting the “Bukele method” of security and beginning the construction of a CECOT-type mega prison. Bukele was invited to the groundbreaking.
He said Costa Rica should be more like Bukele in the fight against drug trafficking-fueled violence. President-elect Fernández, too. She has even suggested implementing a state of exception like in El Salvador.
And she’ll have a simple majority in the Assembly, with 30 out of 57 seats. Recent presidents haven’t gotten more than 10.
For more, read this week’s El Faro English newsletter: Voters Give Second Term to Costa Rican “Chavismo”.
Trump signs trade deal in Guatemala
Last, to Guatemala, where last Friday Bernardo Arévalo followed right behind Nayib Bukele in El Salvador in announcing its own “reciprocal trade agreement” with the Trump administration. Mexico carved out its own deal last year, and El Salvador just promised access to critical minerals.
Now Guatemala, like El Salvador, has pledged to replicate U.S. trade sanctions on third countries “with equivalent effect.” Arévalo, like Bukele, is billing the new deal as a political win for his administration.
Trump State Department Puts El Salvador and Guatemala on Friend List
The United States is putting its own spin on the news. “President Trump’s leadership is forging a new direction for trade that promotes partnership and prosperity in Latin America,” claimed the U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.
Guatemala is of course part of the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement. This new deal works in parallel with it. Early last year, Trump imposed a 10 percent tariff on all imports to the United States, regardless of country or existing agreements.
The Guatemalan agreement now promises that three-quarters of exports to the United States will remain tariff-free.
The Ministry of Economy claims that the agreement strengthens the existing commitments under DR-CAFTA. But Hugo Maul, president of the Center for National Economic Research (CIEN) in Guatemala, notes that CAFTA “was precisely intended to prevent such unilateral measures.“
Guatemala committed to giving preferential access to U.S. agricultural products, and to buy at least 50 million gallons of ethanol from the United States every year. And not all producers benefited from the removal of these tariffs.
The impact is even greater because in the sectors where the tax could not be reduced to 0 percent, Mexico did manage to do so. This includes juices, baby vegetables, footwear, plastics, and aquaculture. Baby vegetables benefit hundreds of thousands of families, including small-scale campesino producers.
“In certain sectors, Mexico is a direct competitor of Guatemala,” says Maul. “So in the U.S. market, what that means directly is that the U.S. buyer says, ‘If you don't sell to me at the Mexican price, I won’t buy from you.’”
He added, “If we had already won in CAFTA, when the reality was the same as it is today, why are we losing this renegotiation?”
This episode was produced with support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. It was written by Yuliana Ramazzini and Roman Gressier with sound design by Omnionn. Subscribe on Apple, Spotify, Amazon, iHeart, and YouTube.