This is perhaps the first time in just over a decade that Honduras will hold elections without any of the country’s three heavyweight political parties able to sidestep publicly known evidence that their leaders dealt with drug traffickers during that very same span of years. The two traditional parties, today’s opposition, were marred by the convictions in U.S. courts of former National Party honcho Juan Orlando Hernández and his brother Tony, on drug trafficking charges; as well as that of Yani Rosenthal, who until May was both a convicted money launderer and president of the Liberal Party. But the pledge of the ruling Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre), which came to power in 2021, to dismantle the “narco-dictatorship” appeared to fall apart last September, when a video showed Carlos “Carlón” Zelaya, then-secretary of Congress and brother-in-law of President Xiomara Castro, cutting a deal to fund her 2013 presidential campaign from the coffers of Los Cachiros. “Half must be for the comandante,” said Carlón, using a common nickname for Castro’s husband-advisor and coordinator general of Libre, Manuel “Mel” Zelaya. Struggling to contest that evidence, Libre has since retreated to accusations of an international coup conspiracy, and to pointing to what is almost a truism at this point: that the other parties have been soiled by drug trafficking.
In this interview with El Faro English in Tegucigalpa last week, Honduran journalist Óscar Estrada, author of Tierra de Narcos (Land of Narcos, 2021), argues that none of these parties are genuinely interested in strengthening institutions through reforms stemming “from the good intentions of international cooperation, but not from a real agreement among the elites.” Estrada, who just launched and directs the morning political analysis program Más Conscientes, also participated in the National Resistance Front, a political coalition opposing the 2009 coup. That border-crossing between journalism and politics gives him particular insight when he asserts that all that is left of the founding mission of Libre is a myth.
Last week, on your show Más Conscientes, you commented on Carlón's video, which was published by InSight Crime a year ago now: You stated that the video undermined the moral authority of the Libre Party. What do you mean?
Libre rose in opposition not only to the coup d'état, which is the founding myth of the party, but also to what they describe as the “narco-dictatorship.” From the video, what is clear is that all the time they were calling the National Party and the Liberal Party “narco-parties,” they had also been receiving funding from the same groups. Now, every time they do so, the issue of Carlos Zelaya always comes up, not only because he is a prominent figure in the party, but also because he was instrumental in forming it. To a large extent, and this has not been proven, but what the opposition whom they previously attacked now uses is that Libre emerged on the largesse of drug trafficking capital. Because they are the same drug traffickers and it is the same amount of money that they give to everyone; that they wanted to make people believe that they did not receive the money, that it was only a negotiation, no-one believes them.
A key aspect of the video is that it was recorded in 2013, during his sister-in-law Xiomara Castro's first presidential campaign. He says he is negotiating on behalf of the campaign.
Yes, during the party's inception. At that time, people still believed that the Liberty and Refoundation Party was a party with different origins and motivations. There was still a certain political plurality. There were political currents: the FRP, Somos Más, and so on. The presidency was never contested; it was assumed that it belonged to Xiomara Castro. Nor was the position of coordinator-general, which people assumed belonged to Manuel Zelaya Rosales. But in the other slates, there was some competition.
By the 2017 pre-election, it was a different party. Money began to flow in favoring certain currents, especially that of the June 28 movement, which coincidentally was the one that Carlos Zelaya formed and coordinated. That is when certain actors began to be displaced, already labeled as traitors. The party began to fracture and those authoritarian vices began to appear, which those of us who were in the National Resistance Front remember were already evident from the beginning. There are political figures in the country who did not participate in the 2013 election process of the Liberty and Refoundation Party because we were displaced and because we were unable to gel within the project. Figures such as Berta Cáceres: She was very critical of the authoritarian process that the party was already undergoing.
Are there any traces left of what the party was like when it was founded?
There is still a certain myth and a certain base that continues to believe in it. If the party wanted to undergo a process of reconstruction after the results of this election, it would have to return to its base, but that would be very difficult because the leadership is very distant from what that base used to be. New leaders would have to emerge, and I don't know if there is room for that.
How was Carlón's video received within Libre?
It was received as a shock. When I published the book Tierra de narcos, one of the complaints I received from many people in Libre was: Why are you telling the story of Carlos Zelaya? They accused me of inventing it, of repeating the rhetoric of the Right. But the video was compelling: Carlos Zelaya's words in that video were received like a bucket of cold water, of reality. There had already been certain rumors within the party, but they were dismissed as just that: malicious and ambiguous rumors spread by enemies of the party or the clan. It had not become so obvious, and that is what really shocks party members and the population that does not belong to Libre, because it completes the narrative about Manuel Zelaya's government, regarding the runway at El Aguacate Airport and that whole issue.
The trial against Juan Orlando Hernández in 2024 and other legal proceedings in recent years in the United States pointed to Carlos and even Mel Zelaya. Was the video really a surprise?
Yes, because the party machinery always came out to deny those judicial statements. There has been a game within the party that if the drug trafficker says it about the opponent, it's true, but if the drug trafficker says it about my ally, it's a lie. They gave him the benefit of the doubt, partly because of the expectations that the party in power had generated. But with the video, no-one can deny it anymore.
This is seen time and time again in Honduras: Even TV commentators acknowledge that there is a narco-state, but in specific cases, no-one is a drug trafficker — and at the same time, the drug trafficker is the opponent. The narco-state is everywhere and nowhere.
That's right. There is a way of being that identifies Hondurans, which is to try to be the wiliest, “el más vivo.” We all want others to follow the rules, but no-one wants to follow them. The general population cares little about illicit capital and drug trafficking in everyday life. That is more of an elite issue, more political. That doesn't mean that everyone would accept drug money in their businesses or daily lives, but the drug war bothers people when there is violence or abuse. In general, they see it as a resource, whether for employment, commerce, or aesthetics. It brings a bit of modernity to a very forgotten municipality. Even if it's kitsch or narco modernity, it's still modernity. There is a large sector of the world's population that feels marginalized from the big conversation, and drug trafficking is a way to enter it.
Let me give you an example: In 2010, I did some research in Moskitia and spent more than a month staying in the Tawkahkaya area, in the small village of Yapuwás. The indigenous leaders took me to an airstrip they were building. They told me, “We're going to bring in planes for tourists and they'll give us cash; the community needs resources to function; we'll be able to get people out in medical emergencies.” That's what they always say when they're building an airstrip in remote areas in the middle of the jungle. I asked them, “Aren't you concerned about drug trafficking?” I think their response reflects the mindset of the average Honduran: They told us, “Look, drug trafficking is not our war. If the state wants to prevent drug traffickers from establishing a foothold, it should send a military contingent to guard the airstrip.” In the end, the airstrip was never completed, but the logic remains.
Let's go back to Libre for a second. When did you distance yourself from the party and how did that process unfold? You spoke a moment ago about “us.”
I was never part of the party. I was involved in the National Resistance Front in 2009, originally as a journalist and then as part of the Artists in Resistance collective. We saw that the coup had opened up a path for social mobilization that could really build a different political process. But we feared from the beginning that focusing the process on Zelayism would end up turning it into a traditional party with the structure of a national party, with its caudillismo and vices, without having really built a social base or a real project. That was the argument back in 2010.
Several assemblies were held in which the National Resistance Front discussed whether or not we wanted a party, because Zelaya's group proposed that the party was the vehicle for achieving power. Our question was, for what? For whom? At the first assembly, the party project was not approved. At that time, Mel and Xiomara were still in exile. At the second assembly, in 2011, it was decided to form the party. Berta Cáceres took the stage to give a speech explaining why the party would end up betraying the political process, and she was booed off the stage. We understood that there was no room for thought, criticism, or dissent within the Libre Party, so we never joined.
The law of the strongest.
In the end, the sombrero weighed heavily.
Let's move on to the second recent narco-video: that of Mauricio Villeda, leader of the Liberal Party, allegedly meeting with Devis Rivera Maradiaga —the same drug trafficker from Carlón's video— to negotiate money for his 2013 presidential campaign. Villeda was also named in the trial against Juan Orlando. How much weight do you give to that video?
I have no doubt that Mauricio Villeda received that money, just as I have no doubt that Carlos Zelaya received it, because the evidence is the same. He says he didn't receive it, but that's what they all say. I interviewed Juan Orlando Hernández in prison from May to August 2024, during the sentencing process, and asked him if the videos really existed. He said yes.
The difference comes from each person's background. In the case of Carlos Zelaya, there were already rumors about his relationship with the drug trafficking structure, even before the video existed. In the case of Mauricio Villeda, his name had come up in court but he was never really linked to these structures. Until the video was shown. Mauricio, as a political figure within the Liberal Party, is now irrelevant.
He was a powerful figure in the 2009 project, but the faces we see now are not the same. I think there is only Yani [Rosenthal, a former presidential candidate convicted in the United States for laundering drug money] and a few other names. Villeda is a congressman, and I would consider that here, after the video, his political career is over. He no longer has the political structure that gave him power in 2013. Nor does he have the weight of Carlos Zelaya, who was secretary of Congress and is the brother of the former president and father of the finance minister.
Here it is important to detail why these videos are emerging. El Cachiro [Devis Maradiaga], before and after meeting with the DEA, understood that his way of negotiating an agreement that would favor him was precisely to use bait. And he set out to find businessmen, politicians... He has a particular hatred for politicians, like any Honduran. If you ask El Cachiro if politicians are corrupt, he says yes, that he hates corruption, even though he is the corrupting agent. He understands very well that the last month of the electoral process is when candidates and parties are desperately looking for money. And that is when drug trafficking seeps in, when they take money from anyone.
If Mauricio Villeda is a nobody in the Liberal Party today, why would his party's presidential candidate, Salvador Nasralla, who does not come from the Liberal ranks, feel the need to come out publicly to deny the video?
It is because there is a link with the Villedas that transcends politics on the part of Salvador Nasralla: He comes from the station Televicentro, and the Villeda family is one of the owners. It must be a friendship; I have no doubt that they are friends and have known each other for a long time. That is why he comes to his defense: an ambiguous defense, but a defense nonetheless.
Nasralla says he did not see an exchange of money in the video, so he sees no wrongdoing. Does this compromise his candidacy in any way?
I don't think it will ultimately affect his candidacy, but it certainly shows that dark money is present in all political parties. I think there has been an effort to remove Yani Rosenthal [president of the Liberal Party until May of this year] from the forefront. We don't see him now as we did before when he was president. At the campaign level, Salvador Nasralla is the party's candidate, but he is not a Liberal. One of the fears among Liberals is that Salvador may break away from the party as he has broken away from the others, and that Libre will take advantage of that. Some analysts believe that Salvador Nasralla, if he wins the presidency, would not have power because he does not control the party and would not control Congress. The Liberal Party has always had several heads, and negotiations after coming to power are what would allow the party to function as a government.
Attorney General Johel Zelaya has already announced that he is investigating Villeda, but he has not lifted a finger in public with regard to Carlón. Is he independent from the government?
No, no. The Public Prosecutor's Office lacks independence. Any attempt to prosecute Mauricio Villeda will only be an attempt to damage the candidacy of Nasralla and the Liberal Party, because they have nothing but the video... and even then, they have no proof that he received that money. In the case of [Brigadier General] Romeo Vázquez, in the other video they released, there is apparently money on the table. But in the case of Mauricio Villeda, if they prosecute him without that cash, they would be obliged to prosecute Carlos Zelaya, because it is the same year, the same actors, and the same absence of cash.
Let's round out the big three candidates with Tito Asfura of the National Party. He has the heavy burden of the legacy of Juan Orlando Hernández's narco-politics. In 2021, voters gave the party a beating. Is Asfura running on conservatism without the sins of JOH?
Once again, we return to the narco-video: It helped the National Party a lot, because of the rhetoric of Juan Orlando and his family, that in his case there are no videos, no photos, nothing concrete beyond the testimonies of the same drug traffickers we saw negotiating with Carlos Zelaya. That video reinforced the narrative that Juan Orlando has been unfairly judged. Whether that is true or not is another discussion. We see in the current numbers that the National Party has not suffered losses at the grassroots level. It is currently the most solid party in the country — it lacks leadership, but it has structure. And that structure is working in every territory, every municipality, every village where it is active.
“We investigated Juan Orlando Hernández’s caudillos, and now Mel Zelaya’s”
It is mobilizing, generating all the machinery it needs to win the electoral process. Tito Asfura has tried to distance himself from the figure of Juan Orlando Hernández and has done so, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for him, precisely because of the mythical construction among a certain part of the population that, when Juan Orlando was in power, there was order and things worked. Eventually, Asfura would have to reconcile with the figure of Juan Orlando Hernández in order to have a government with control of the National Party. What most unified the party was when Libre began to label all nationalists as “narco-cachurecos”, trading on a party nickname. The average citizen, who is a classic conservative, does not like that kind of talk.
That is why Tito Asfura is campaigning under the slogan “Now or never.”
Yes. It's about creating a sense of urgency within the party, because they feel under attack by the Libre government and the idea has been created that a new Libre government would mean the destruction of the party. Destruction and the void. I think it's working to reconfigure and reconstitute the National Party.
What is your interpretation of the fact that the Clean Politics Unit is, number one, without a budget and, number two, like many institutions, chopped up between the three parties?
The Clean Politics Unit arose, like many things in Honduras, from the good intentions of international cooperation, but not from a real agreement among the elites. In other words, the elites did not decide that order had to be brought to political campaign financing. It was imposed by the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States. The truth is that none of the parties wants their finances scrutinized. This does not mean that all campaigns are of illicit origin, but those who finance campaigns do not always want their names to appear. On the other hand, Libre has an added incentive to let the Clean Politics Unit fail: their use of state funds. We saw this in the primaries. We have no doubt that we will see similar cases in the general elections.
Is all this fertile ground for drug financing?
Without a doubt. I believe that there is drug financing and that there will be in the campaigns. I couldn't tell you who will receive more or less. But not only because of campaign issues and regional and local interests, but also because of international issues. The issue of Venezuela weighs heavily here. The Venezuelan government was a major financier in the previous internal elections of Libre and in the construction of the party. Money came from Venezuela through Nicaragua to finance mobilizations, assemblies, and all that. The truth is that Venezuela needs Honduras to remain an ally.
What evidence have you seen to think that there is drug money this year?
The main link I could explain now is the lack of control. There is no way of knowing whether it exists or not, but the opportunity and the need are there. The conditions before 2021 have not changed. The only thing that has changed is the political alignment of the U.S. government. In 2021, it was emotionally involved in a change of party, and the most favorable circumstance for that was the Libre government. Right now, the U.S. government is emotionally involved in another change of party. It remains to be seen whether that bet will go to Nasralla or Asfura. I think it will go to Nasralla, because of the links with Juan Orlando Hernández's structure that still exists in the National Party.
Is the risk of illicit financing a threat to the integrity of the electoral process or is it business as usual?
There are three sources of financing for political campaigns. If you don't have your own money, there is transnational capital from corporations in the energy, banking, agro-industrial, and other sectors that invest in political campaigns. Second, there is the state as a source of income. And third, there is drug trafficking. Those who resort to drug trafficking tend to be those who feel most disadvantaged because they do not have access to the other two. Drug trafficking capital is an important player in elections. If we do not know this for the 2021 election, it is because no-one has investigated it yet.
In addition, the elites feel betrayed by the United States. For example, El “Tigre” Bonilla and Juan Orlando Hernández were once efficient agents in achieving the objectives of the United States. Then, due to changes in U.S. domestic policy, Hondurans feel betrayed. They say, “I did what I did because it was what we needed to do, and now you're coming after me for it?” Having these oversight bodies, even if they are toothless institutions like the Clean Politics Unit, consolidates a narrative that will later work against the elites. Not in Honduras, but in courtrooms in the United States.
But if we accept the thesis of the court in New York that convicted Juan Orlando, what could be his logic for thinking that he had done what the United States asked him to do?
They were effective people in the United States at that stage. But in the end, the United States is driven by interests, and we are seeing this with Donald Trump: how narratives are disrupted according to the interests of the group that is currently in power. I believe that Juan Orlando Hernández's links to drug trafficking were not proven at trial. What was proven was the existence of a corrupt politician, a politician hated precisely because of what was testified against him. The laxity of the burden of proof required to carry out this process found him guilty. But it is the way in which the New York court constructs narratives and testimonies that makes it virtually impossible for anyone who falls into that chair to walk free. Whether they are guilty or not. And was he guilty at heart? I don't know.
That is the fear of the Zelaya family: They don't need to prove anything to put them in prison for life. With the rumors we have, with the articles we have, with the things that people “know,” in quotation marks, that is enough to sentence them to life in prison.
You're saying that you think we'll never know for sure.
No, we won't. The fight against drug trafficking has always been the political issue of the United States. The global war on drugs is failing. What there is, is an interest in managing the flow of drugs. Drug trafficking also works to generate resources for the United States: if not, how was Miami built? The U.S. government needs to create these great enemies, because otherwise, how can it justify to the public that with all the resources the U.S. has, with all its intelligence and all its satellites, its streets are full of fentanyl? How can you explain it if not with the betrayal of the elites of these countries?
In the case of Juan Orlando Hernández, there is also racism. The American public is prone to accept that all Honduran politicians are corrupt and drug traffickers, whether I present evidence or not. It's Speedy González coming from across the border. In other words, I believe that this country cannot function without drug money. Its economy cannot function. When drug money disappears, its security collapses. Because it also helps with social control. Political campaigns need drug trafficking, and the United States knows this very well. The Carlón video, I mean, they've had that video since 2013. They kept that video for 12 years and released it when it was politically convenient for them.
Is your theory that the DEA leaked the video?
Yes, or the State Department. Who else has it? El Cachiro.
Regarding the prosecution of cases in the United States, between the cases of Juan Orlando and Tony Hernández, politicians from all three parties were implicated. Don't you really think there was evidence to say that Juan Orlando or Carlón or any of the others mentioned were guilty?
That makes me believe the drug traffickers' word. But when we are going to judge the president of a country, we need more than just the word of a witness. The prosecution said it had hundreds of terabytes of compelling evidence, and then it comes out with testimony that does not stand up to scrutiny. El Cachiro describes in his testimony that in 2012, for the birthday of Moncho Lobo, brother of President Porfirio Lobo, there was a party at his house in Bonito Oriental. At that party, El Cachiro says that several drug traffickers made video calls to him. He describes in his testimony how they show him the calls and say, “Look, here I am with Juan Orlando hugging him” and all that. In other words, the party took place. It was reported in the press. There are photos. I have no doubt that, being the Cachiros' territory, they knew about that party. I don't know if they were invited or not; El Cachiro's testimony says they were invited. But what I can tell you is that, in 2012, there was no internet in Bonito Oriental.
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How did they make the video call? How does that hold up in cross-examination? The New York lawyers and the jury don't know Bonito Oriental; perhaps for them it has everything Manhattan had in 2012 and therefore it must have internet. Because this is the home of the brother of the president of Honduras. But today there is still no internet in Bonito Oriental. Go to Bonito Oriental and make a video call and you'll see how it drops. And the same thing for [the testimonies of] Fabio [Lobo] and Chande Ardón. I notice the prosecution's attempts to say, “No, say these words instead of those. Call it this way instead of that way,” so that all the testimony fits into a single narrative constructed in order to avoid any contradictions.
In short, do you think it's possible that they had these links to drug traffickers, but that they weren't proven?
I think that all the presidential candidates who have participated since the 2013 elections —and possibly from 2005 to date— have received, directly or indirectly, financing from drug trafficking. All of them, because the country functions with drug trafficking financing in political campaigns. I don't think that makes them drug traffickers. I don't think Juan Orlando Hernández was a trafficker.
I don't know about Tony. I think it's another case and that he's just an idiot: he liked to hang out with drug traffickers, to be in that environment. He was guilty of arrogance, and his own testimony is what ended up dragging him down. But if you listen to what he's saying in the context of Honduras, it makes sense. “Do you know so-and-so?” “Yes, I know them.” They're from the same place, after all. “We met up in El Palenque.” “And he gave you a horse?” “Yes, he gave me the horse.” That kind of thing happens within the country, and that was enough to convict him.
I think Carlos Zelaya's case has a lot more background than Tony's, but I haven't seen any evidence to confirm that the Zelayas are drug traffickers, or that they have any connection beyond the political relationship that all provincial leaders have with some criminal group that controls that province.
Does Honduran society care that some leaders of each of the three main parties have been accused of having ties to organized crime?
I think when it becomes very obvious, it's annoying. People don't like to vote for criminals, but they reject politicians who are arrogant or aggressive toward the community even more. They should care, but this is how this country has always been governed. We don't know any other way. We have tried pastors, we have tried all kinds of creeds, and it turns out that they are all the same. The idea that politics can be corrected with good intentions and clean morals is false. We cannot correct this; it requires stronger institutions. Since candidates are already tainted by the interests of organized crime, there is no interest in cleaning up the institutions. But people don't care about that because they don't understand it. The need for democracy does not reach communities. Political activism arrives, the flag arrives, the militant arrives. But ordinary people incorporate none of that into their daily lives.
The cases from the JOH era focus on Los Cachiros. They recounted their control, their influence, their contacts. Who are the main players in drug trafficking in Honduras today?
The same ones. Nothing has changed. Anywhere. Los Cachiros, the Valle family, the Ardón family, the Pinto family. Cases were brought that shook things up, but they have the same tricks up their sleeves. Some are even returning to take control of their structures again with complete impunity, with all their experience, with a clean name. In five years, we will see them again in court. Nothing has changed.